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WOODSY WITCHDOCTORS VERSUS JUDICIAL 
GUERRILLAS: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF 
COMPETING INTEREST GROUPS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION* 
Gregory L. Hassler** 
Karen O'Connor*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970's, David Brower, then president of the Friends 
of the Earth, and his preservationist colleagues were portrayed as 
"the modern-day equivalents of the druidical wizards of ancient 
Celtic tribes, who sacrificed human lives to the spirits thought to 
dwell in oak trees."1 By the early 1980s, such "'woodsy witchdoctors 
of a revived ancient nature cult' who sought to restore our nation's 
environment to its disease-ridden, often hungry wilderness state,"2 
became portrayed as participants in a "pure environmentalism . . . 
protectionist elitism, betraying a 'last-man-through-the-gate' men-
* The Authors gratefully acknowledge the Emory University Law School for assistance in 
research of this article. 
** B.A. Appalachian State University, 1974; M. T.S Harvard University, 1976; Ph.D. Emory 
University, 1981; J.D. Emory University, 1986. Staff Attorney, U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Disability Division, Atlanta, Georgia. 
*** B.A. SUNY College at Buffalo, 1973; J.D. SUNY at Buffalo, 1977; Ph.D. SUNY at 
Buffalo, 1978. Associate Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Professor of Law, Emory 
University. 
1 R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 238 (2d ed. 1973). 
2Id. For other examples of the vehemence with which conservatives view environmental-
ists, see Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1461 (1984). Anti-preservationists, 
of course, were not immune from caricature by environmentalists. No less than John Muir, 
the first president of the Sierra Club, described "those who could bring only utilitarian criteria 
to wild places" as "'selfish seekers of immediate Mammon." Id. at 158. A former member of 
another liberal group stated that "[p]ublic interest law ... should represent 'the breathers 
as opposed to the polluters." Quinn, Practicing Public Interest Law the Conservative Way, 1 
WESTERN L.J. (reprint) (1980). 
48'1 
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tality,"3 and as advocates of "preservationist extremism."4 The ve-
hemence of such descriptions may have been partly due to the fact 
that "[e]nvironmentalists made more demands on the federal trial 
courts than did economic groups during the period from 1970 to 
1980."5 When these courts began giving victories to organized 
"woodsy witchdoctors," "victories [that] were beginning to affect 
conservative interests that often had a financial stake in the outcome 
of particular cases,"6 other groups were formed to enter the battle. 7 
The suggestion that the courts are battlefields of competing group 
interests emerges as something of an understatement when environ-
mental issues are the foci of the litigation.8 A perusal of the literature 
of various conservative, business-oriented9 public interest law firms 
such as the Mountain States or Pacific Legal Foundations reveals 
the intensity of the combatants: "[t]heir reports and brochures are 
sprinkled with feisty language such as government regulations are 
'choking private enterprise' and conservatives must . . . counter 
'preservationist extremism."'lo The Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation 
considers that its organization serves "as a counterforce to narrow-
interest groups who exploit the judicial system [creating] delay in 
3 PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT (1981). 
4 PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT (1982). 
5 Wenner, Interest Group Litigation and Environmental Policy, 11 POL'y STUD. J. at 673 
(1983). 
6 O'Connor & Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest 
Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 483, 493 (1984). 
7 The tenn conservative interest group as used here and throughout the paper generally 
refers to pro-business interests and/or groups who began to take a strong stand against 
government regulation in the 1970s. See also Houck, supra note 2, at 1415-1563. 
8 O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 6, at 484. This fact is not surprising. A vast body of 
research has documented the pervasive role that interest groups playas amicus curiae or 
actual parties/direct sponsors in Supreme Court litigation. O'Connor and Epstein, for example, 
found that women's groups participated in 73 percent of the cases involving gender-based 
discrimination decided by the Supreme Court between the 1969 and 1980 tenns. O'Connor & 
Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying: Women's Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67 
JUDICATURE 134, 134-137 (1983). Another study by the same authors found that between 
1970 and 1980, at least one amicus was filed in 53.4 percent of all the non-commercial cases 
decided by the Court during that period. O'Connor & Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation 
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman's Folklore, 16 LAW & SOC'y 
REV. 316 (1981-82). 
9 In one of the first analyses of these finns' amici activities, law professors Ellen R. Jordan 
and Paul H. Rubin first referred to these finns as business-oriented legal foundations. Jordan 
& Rubin, Government Regulation and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Conservative Legal 
Foundations, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 256 (McGuigan and Rader, eds. 1981). 
They and others soon came to agree on the label "conservative" to describe the regional legal 
foundations discussed herein. See generally Houck, supra note 2, at 1455-56. 
10 Flaherty, Right Wing Firms Pick up Steam, Nat'l L.J. May 25, 1983, at 26; col. 3. 
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developing America's mineral and energy resources."l1 Another 
spokesperson for conservative public interest law described the lit-
igational process as "a real uphill battle against the elitists who are 
attempting to stop resource development. "12 Phrases such as "we 
defend," "we've fought," and "we battle [and] combat"13 appear as 
appropriate backdrops to conservatives' own descriptions of their 
tactics: "legal militancy;" "judicial guerrilla warfare;" and "the new 
social revolution. "14 In contrast, environmental groups generally 
have chosen to dismiss their opponents as ideologues unworthy of 
notice. 15 However, given some commentators' suggestions that con-
servative public interest law firms are winning the litigation battle 
against environmentalists, this confidence may be unwarranted. Po-
litical scientist Lettie Wenner, for instance, concludes that during 
the decade of the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court favored 
economic interests over environmental ones. 16 Professor Wenner also 
notes that, during the 1980's, "the major hope for environmentalists 
lies in increasing their organizational strength and legal expertise."17 
Political scientist Frank Sorauf also argues that environmentalists 
do not present constitutional claims, and thus by necessity they are 
largely limited to litigating issues, making their task increasingly 
difficult. IS Law professors Ellen Jordan and Paul Rubin also have 
observed that the litigation of rules, as opposed to constitutional 
issues, is an area of law particularly well suited to successful litiga-
tion by conservative legal foundations who seek to convince the 
courts that environmental rules and regulations markedly detract 
from the efficient operation of government. 19 And, writing even 
before the creation of most of the conservative legal foundations 
created to fight costly governmental regulations,20 law professors 
11 MID-ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, DEFENDING YOUR RIGHTS (Fall 1981). 
12 Environmentalists to Use Sale o/Timber As National Challenge, The Anchorage Times, 
April 26, 1980, at 26, col. l. 
13 GULF COAST AND GREAT PLAINS LEGAL FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT 
(1984). 
" Speech by R. Momboisse at the University of Wisconsin Law School, Public Interest 
Law - Plague or Panacea (April 13, 1980). 
15 Interview with representatives of various environmental groups, July-Aug. 1985. 
16 Wenner, supra note 5, at 680. 
17Id. 
18 Sorauf, Winning in the Courts: Interest Groups and Constitutional Change, in THIS 
CONSTITUTION 10 (Fall 1984). 
19 Jordan & Rubin, supra note 9, at 257. 
20 For example, Houck graphically presents data to support his thesis that many of the 
foundations were created by or continue to be supported by large corporations who saw a 
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David Trubeck and William J. Gillen noted that the increasing factual 
and technical complexity of litigation in the environmental law area 
did not bode well for environmentalists, who had only limited finan-
cial resources to devote to this kind of costly litigation.21 In contrast, 
large corporations have a continued, personal stake in the funding 
of conservative legal foundations who then can appear as amici in 
support of the pro-business position. 22 
Moreover, President Reagan's political philosophy includes the 
notion that quality of life means more than protection and preser-
vation; it also means "the continued economic and technological de-
velopment essential to our standard of living."23 The hopes of envi-
ronmentalists in President Reagan's first administration were 
dashed by his appointments of James Watt (former president of the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF» and Anne Gorsuch (who 
also had close ties to MSLF), as Secretary of the Interior and Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, respectively. 24 
Perhaps even more significant to environmentalists than the ap-
pointments of Watt or Gorsuch, was the appointment of Rex E. Lee 
as Solicitor General of the United States.25 Mr. Lee was a former 
member of the MSLF Board of Litigation. The potential of this kind 
of governmental support was immediately recognized by conserva-
tive attorneys. 26 
need to have their view of the "public interest" represented in court. Houck, supra note 2, 
at 1455-56. 
21 Trubek & Gillen, Environmental Defense, II: Examini'YI{J the Limits of Interest Group 
Advocacy in Complex Disputes, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 195, 215 (B. Weisbrod, J. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978). 
22 Houck, supra note 2, at 1458 (citing The Powell Memorandum, Wash. Rep., Supp. No. 
2900, U.S. Chamber of Com. (1971)); EpSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985). 
23 Keisling, The Reagan Chainsaw Massacre, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 25, 30 (Oct. 1, 1984). 
24 Wenner, supra note 5, at 682, noting that Watt and Gorsuch "conspired to eviscerate 
environmental protections." 
25 In an examination of sex discrimination cases, Segal and Reedy found that "when the 
solicitor general filed a liberal brief, the Court reached a liberal decision 90% of the time. 
When he filed no amicus brief, a liberal decision was reached in 69% of the cases, and when 
he filed a conservative brief, a liberal decision was reached in only 36% of the cases. The 
Supreme Court, Representative Democracy and Sex Discrimination: The Role of the Solicitor 
General, Paper prepared for delivery by J. Segal & C. Reedy, 1985 Annual Meeting American 
Political Science Association, at 19. 
Interviews, in July and September 1984, by one of the authors with several of. the Justices 
confirm these findings. According to one, "the ablest advocates in the U.S. are in the Solicitor 
General's Office." Another Justice noted that ''by tradition" the Solicitor "had a high calibre 
lawyer working on his staff." This respect, undoubtedly, as Segal, Reedy and others have 
demonstrated, has been translated into the Court's near adoption of the Solicitor General as 
its "ninth and a half member." Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due 
Process: A Quarter Century of Advocacy, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 481, 482 (1968). 
26 For example, the Chairman of the MSLF Board, in commenting on these appointments, 
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This article challenges the prevailing notion that conservative pub-
lic interest groups are victors in the battle for the environment. This 
article presents the contrary view that, since 1979,27 environmental 
interest groups participating either as sponsoring parties or as ami-
cus curiae in United States Supreme Court litigation have been more 
successful than their conservative counterparts in those cases where 
environmental issues were at stake. Moreover, this article reveals 
that, in cases where opposing public interest law firms entered the 
battle as amicus curiae, environmentalists were successful more 
than twice as often as conservative public interest firms. This con-
clusion is even more noteworthy in light of the reputed conservatism 
of the Supreme Court. To further explore these unexpected findings, 
the participation of eight legal groups in United States Supreme 
Court litigation is examined. Four environmental groups perceived 
as representative of liberal interests - Friends of the Earth, the 
National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and the Sierra Club - and four groups representative of 
conservative interests - the Mid-America Legal Foundation, the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation, the New England Legal Foun-
dation, and the Pacific Legal Foundation - were selected for study. 
The first section of this article presents the major environmental 
interest groups and the seven cases in which they have participated 
without any conservative group involvement. The second section 
examines conservative interest groups and the six cases in which 
they have participated without any environmental group involve-
ment. The final section analyzes six cases in which representatives 
from one or more of each ideological group appeared before the Court 
in a head-to-head confrontation in their respective efforts to resolve 
the environmental issue(s) at stake in the litigation. In each section, 
the participation of the United States government is also discussed 
to gain a better understanding of its role in environmental litigation. 
for example, noted the importance of working "in tandem with the new administration to 
bring about change." MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT (1981). 
27 The year 1979 was chosen because briefs of all parties and amicus curiae are available on 
LEXIS from that time. Given that most of the conservative public interest law firms included 
for study here did not become operational until 1977, see generally O'Connor & Epstein, supra 
note 6, at 497-98, we do not believe that use of this late date presents any significant analytical 
problems. We do, however, recognize that LEXIS, at times, under-reports amicus partici-
pation as does the U.S. Reports. 
Attempts were,made to contact each of the groups included for study here to obtain evidence 
of any nnder-reporting or inaccuracies. These groups were chosen after a list of all groups 
participating in each environmental case was compiled. The resultant groupings include the 
four most litigious groups in each category - at least at the level of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST GROUPS 
There are myriad environmental interest groups bringing suits in 
various courts throughout the nation. 28 These include ad hoc groups 
formed around a single disturbance, regional groups concentrating 
on a single issue, and other groups with a national focus. Their cases, 
all with sponsoring groups as named plaintiffs, collectively have had 
a major impact on the course of environmental law in the United 
States in landmark cases such as Sierra Club v. Morton;29 Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe;30 Calvert Cliff's Coordi-
nating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion;31 and, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council. 32 The collective participation of all of these 
groups in United States Supreme Court litigation, however, far 
exceeds the scope of the present essay. Consequently, cases involv-
ing only four environmental interest groups, all of which are national 
in scope, have been selected for analysis here - the Sierra club, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Friends of the Earth and the 
National Wildlife Federation. 
The Sierra Club (SC), for instance, is recognized as one of the 
leading conservation groups in the country.33 It was founded on June 
4, 1892, when twenty-seven men formed the organization and unan-
imously elected John Muir as its first president. 34 Its stated purposes 
include the enhancement and protection of "natural resources and 
the human environment of the United States and the earth in gen-
eral. "35 In 1971, however, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund 
(SCLDF) was created to provide legal representation for private 
28 Examples of such groups include the Animal Welfare Institute, Appalachian Mountain 
Club, Air Quality Control Coalition, Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Bass Anglers Sportsman 
Society, California Coastal Commission, Buffalo River Conservation and Recreation Council, 
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, Carolina Environmental Study Group, Citizens Against the 
Refinery's effects, Citizens committee for the Hudson Valley, Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, Clemont Environmental Reclamation company, Concerned About Trident, Conservation 
Counsel, Friends of Mommoth, Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of Coastal Corridor, 
Life of the Land, 1000 Friends of Oregon, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, Wilderness Alive, 
and Wisconsin Environmental Decade. 
29 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
3() 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
31 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
32 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
33 F. SCHAUMBERG, JUDGMENT RESERVED: A LANDMARK ENVIRONMENTAL CASE 16 
(1976). 
34 R. NASH, supra note 1, at 132-33. 
35 Brief Amicus Curiae by the Sierra Club in support of Petitioner, The State of Minnesota, 
at 2, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US 456 (1981) (79-1171) [hereinafter Sierra 
Club Brief]. 
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interest groups and conservation-minded individuals. Commentators 
attribute to the SCLDF the filing of more federal environmental 
cases during the 1970's than any other single environmental group. 36 
These cases ran the gamut from objecting to the construction of 
highways and dams to the licensing of nuclear power plants. 37 Ac-
cording to the Sierra Club's Executive Director, the SCLDF pro-
vides such representation not only to its principal client, the Sierra 
Club, but also to numerous other national, regional, and local groups 
interested in protecting environmental quality. 38 
Similarly, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), 
embodies the ideals of other environmental interest groups. NRDC 
claims over 28,000 members residing in all states and territories. 39 
Its articulated goal is "the prudent management and the wise use of 
the natural resources of the earth . . . through the advocacy of 
effective federal, state, and local laws. "40 Perhaps not coincidentally, 
the same group of lawyers who founded the NRDC had previously 
joined in litigating the Scenic Hudson Preservation Commission v. 
Federal Power Commission case41, which is thought to have directly 
resulted in the modern environmental movement. 42 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) filed more than ten federal court cases 
during the 1970'S.43 Organized in July of 1969,44 FOE claims 32,000 
members and states its goals "to secure preservation and protection 
of the nation's heritage of outstanding free-flowing rivers and 
streams, the diminution of which has become an increasing concern 
.... "45 The National Wildlife Federation (NWF), founded in 1939, 
initiated the same number of cases in federal courts as the FOE,46 
and is the largest non-governmental conservation group in the 
world. 47 
36 See Wenner, supra note 5, at 674. 
37 Id.; see, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 
43 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D. Colo. 1976); Sierra Club v. 
Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Md. 1973). 
38 Response of F.P. Sutherland to Public Interest Survey by one of authors, July 19, 1985. 
39 Brief of Amici Curiae National Wildlife Federation in Support of Respondents at app. 
A-4, Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984) 
(82-2056). [hereinafter N.W.F. Brief]. 
40 Id. at A-4. 
41 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
42 J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 44 (1978). 
43 Wenner, supra note 5, at 676. 
44 R. NASH, supra note 1, at 254. 
46 N.W.F. Brief, supra note 39, at A-3. 
46 Wenner, supra note 5, at 676. 
47 In fact, N.W.F. claims over 4.5 million members worldwide. Brief of the National Wildlife 
Federation, North Dakota Wildlife Federation, and National Audubon Society as Amici 
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During the 1979 to 1984 terms of the United States Supreme 
Court, these four environmental groups participated either as ami-
cus curiae, or as parties in fourteen cases in which environmental 
issues were the direct focus of the conflict.48 The environmentalists 
were successful in nine cases, enjoying a 64 per cent success rate. 
The first section of this article explores the seven cases in which 
these groups participated without involvement of conservative legal 
groups. In these cases, they enjoyed only a slightly lower success 
rate of 57 per cent. 
A. Public Interest Litigation 
Scholars who have examined the role and/or success of interest 
groups in United States Supreme Court litigation point to several 
factors deemed necessary for interest group success in constitutional 
litigation.49 These factors include the extent to which the issue is 
sharply defined; the level of coordination and cooperation with other 
interest groups; and the intervention or support offered by the fed-
eral government. When environmental groups involve themselves in 
one anothers' cases as amici, they are perceived as both cohesive 
and efficiently organized in their activities. In fact, such strength in 
numbers and cohesion triggered the actual creation of the conser-
vative public law movement. The former Managing Attorney of the 
Washington D.C office of the Pacific Legal Foundation concludes 
that the environmentalists' united front panicked the public into 
believing that "industry was spewing poisons into our planet and 
producing faulty, shoddy products that endangered life and limb."50 
As a result, many conservative public interest law firms were formed 
to counteract this perception. 
Curiae in Support of Appellee at 2, North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983) (81-
773) [hereinafter N.W.F. Amici Brief]. 
48 The following cases were considered "non-environmental" for purposes of analysis here: 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (attorney fees in federal civil action calculated according 
to prevailing market prices); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983) (attorney's fee 
award held inappropriate); National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal 
Serv., 462 U.S. 810 (1983) (rate commission's construction of act reasonable); Regan v. Tax-
ation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (tax-exempt organizations cannot lobby); 
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Co., 461 U.S. 402 (1983) (FERC rules 
valid); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (statute forbidding ground-
water removal violative of commerce clause); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 
U.S. 609 (1981) (state's severance tax on coal mined in state held constitutional). 
49 K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF THE COURTS 17 (1980). 
50 Momboisse, Anti-Business Public Law Firms vs. Private Enterprise - The Unequal 
Struggle, Speech at the NAM National Public Affairs Conference in Boca Raton, Florida, 
Jan. 16, 1981 at 18. 
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Between 1979 and 1984, environmentalists were involved in liti-
gation before the Court over four major issues: wildlife preservation, 
effluent pollution, oil and gas leases, and water conservation. 51 In 
North Dakota v. United States52 the Department of Interior sought 
to protect specified wetlands areas because of their importance for 
the breeding and nesting of migratory waterfowl. The state resisted, 
and although the governor had consented to the grant of an ease-
ment, the state attempted to place limitations and conditions on this 
easement. 53 Amici curiae briefs filed in support of the United States 
included those by the NWF, the North Dakota Wildlife Federation, 
and the National Audubon Society. The amici argued that such 
limitations and conditions frustrated congressional purposes and ob-
jectives, and therefore the state statutes restricting federal ease-
ments were preempted by the overriding national interest in pro-
tecting migratory birds. 54 The Court agreed, and held that once the 
required gubernatorial consent had been given, it could not be re-
voked. 55 
The nation's beleaguered coastline endured further beleaguering 
as a result of the decision in Secretary of Interior v. California. 56 
This case involved efforts to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior 
from selling oil and gas leases on the outer continental shelf off the 
California coast within twelve miles of the Sea Otter Range in the 
Santa Maria Basin near Santa Barbara.57 Respondent NRDC argued 
that the court below was correct in holding that a proposed lease of 
oil and gas rights on the outer continental shelf in an area immedi-
ately adjacent to the California coast directly affected that area, thus 
requiring the project to be conducted in a manner consistent with 
the California coastal management program. 58 The NRDC sought 
enforcement by the Court of Congress' careful scheme designed to 
protect the national interest in our coast through cooperative fed-
eralism. 59 The Court rejected NRDC's argument, and held that the 
51 Other possible issues surrounding environmental concerns recognized, yet not within the 
scope of this essay, include attorneys' fees. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886; Ruckelshaus 
v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680. 
52 460 U.S. 300 (1983). 
53 NWF Amici Brief, supra note 47, at 5-17. 
54 Id. at 3-5. 
55 North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. at 313. 
56 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
57Id. at 317-20. 
58 Brief of Respondents at 1, Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (82-
1326). 
59 Id. at 3. 
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sale of oil and gas leases on the outer continental shelf did not 
"directly affect" the coastal zone, and therefore, compliance with the 
Coastal Zone Management Act was not required. 60 
In a later case, FOE, NRDC, and SC joined with several other 
organizations61 as amicus curiae supporting the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency in Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto CO.62 In this case, Mon-
santo challenged the 1978 Amendment to the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which required pesticide 
manufacturers to register their products with the EPA before mar-
keting them in the United States. 63 Amici sought to support the 
EPA in regulating avoidable health hazards resulting from pesticide 
production. 64 Recognizing that modern pesticide chemistry involves 
new chemicals whose effects upon beneficial plants, animals and the 
environment, as well upon human beings, is not known, these groups 
had attempted to obtain from the EPA health and safety data they 
relied upon in a proposed pesticide registration by Monsanto. 65 Mon-
santo objected to such a disclosure arguing that it represented an 
unconstitutional taking of its property.66 The Court agreed with 
amici. The Court, finding that the EPA's disclosure data from post-
1978 pesticide registration applications does not constitute a taking 
of property,67 vacated the lower court's ruling and remanded. 
The NRDC was equally unsuccessful in C hemical Manufacturers 
Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 68 In Chemical 
Manufacturers, NRDC challenged the EPA's interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorized the EPA to control dis-
charges of pollutants into navigable waters. Towards this end, the 
EPA was authorized to establish nationwide standards limiting the 
amount of toxic pollutants that could be discharged by any source. 
The NRDC argued that the language and legislative history of the 
CWA indicated that Congress intended these pretreatment stan-
dards to apply to all sources. 69 The Act accommodated this intention 
by providing that the EPA be directed to control two types of 
industrial polluters: (1) the direct dischargers who dump waste water 
60 464 U.S. at 315. 
61 E.g., the Environmental Defense Fund, National Coalition Against Pesticides, and the 
National Audubon Society. 
62 463 U.S. 1315 (1983). 
63 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982). 
64 Amicus brief for Appellant at 1, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 463 U.S. 1315 (1983) (A-1066). 
65 [d. 
66 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U.S. 1315 (1983). 
67 [d. 
68 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985). 
69 Respondent's Brief at 7-10, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. National Resources Defense 
Council, 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985) (83-1013). 
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directly into navigable waters; and (2) the indirect dischargers who 
dump waste water into municipal sewage plants, which, in turn 
discharge into navigable waters.70 On the other hand, the EPA, 
joined by parties such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
American Cyanamid Corporation, and Union Carbide Corporation, 
argued that the EPA had been authorized to grant variances from 
national pretreatment standards for toxic pollutants. 71 The Court 
accepted this latter argument, broadly noting that neither statutory 
language nor legislative history nor goals and operation of the sta-
tutory scheme precluded the EPA interpretation of a statute which 
prohibits modification of toxic pollutant effluent limitations as per-
mitting the grant of fundamentally different factor variances for 
those pollutants. 72 It was not altogether surprising that the Court 
rejected the environmentalists' arguments. This was a case where 
the actions of the U. S. government's rule-making powers were being 
directly challenged and the regulations involved were portrayed as 
costly to the interests of business. 
Chemical Manufacturers was not the only water resource man-
agement case that was litigated by environmental groups. Since 
1979, environmental groups have litigated three such cases, winning 
two out of the three cases. 73 In California v. Sierra Club74 the SC, 
joined by the NWF and Operation Wildlife as amicus curiae, 
brought a suit against various state and federal officials to enjoin 
the further operation or construction of certain water diversion fa-
cilities. 75 The issue before the Court was whether the Rivers and 
Harbors Appropriation Act of 189976 provided the Sierra Club a right 
to injunctive relief (i.e., a private cause of action) against officials 
who sought to alter the operation of California's Delta pumping 
plant. The Delta pumping plant, according to amicus curiae, has the 
capacity to remove from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta millions 
of acre-feet of water each year.77 However, the Court refused to 
recognize an implied private right of action on behalf of those injured 
by an alleged violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 78 
70 Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petitioners at 2-4, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985) (83-1013). 
71 Id. at i. 
72 See 105 S. Ct. at 1112. 
73 Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Board of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984); 
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
74 451 U. S. 287 (1981). 
75Id. at 289. 
76 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467e (1980). 
77 Brief for The National Wildlife Federation and for Operation Wildlife as Amici Curiae 
Urging Affirmance at 2-3, California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (79-1252). 
78 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 292-98. 
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In Nevada v. United States,79 environmentalists participated in 
litigation that was perceived to be "one of the great resource cases 
of our time - a rare instance in which the death of a large and 
wondrous place is at stake."so Nevada represents the culmination of 
litigation that began in 1913 when the United States sued "to adju-
dicate water rights to the Truckee River for the benefit of the 
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and the planned N ewlands Recla-
mation Project. "81 In that first suit, "all water users on the Truckee 
River in Nevada" were named as defendants.82 Thirty-one years 
later, in 1944, the District Court entered a final settlement decree, 
awarding various water rights to the Reservation and the Project. 83 
By this time the Project was under the management of the Truckee-
Carson Irrigation District. 84 In 1973, the United States began the 
Nevada action under consideration "on behalf of the Pyramid Lake 
Indian Reservation, seeking additional water rights to the Truckee 
River,"85 with the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe intervening in support 
of the government. In this suit, the federal government named as 
defendants "all persons presently claiming water rights to the 
Truckee River,"86 including the defendants from the earlier 1913 
litigation and their successors, individual farmers who owned land 
in the N ewlands Reclamation Project, and the Trqckee-Carson Ir-
rigation District. 87 
Nevada, predictably, argued that res judicata protects all the 
defendants in this case, and that the original 1944 decree is not 
tainted by a conflict on the part of the United States and did not 
deny due process.88 The United States, on the other hand, main-
tained that res judicata does not bar [a] cause of action to quiet title 
in the United States to a reserved right to Truckee waters to main-
tain a fishery for the benefit of the [Indian] Tribe.89 Amici sought to 
advance the lower court's conclusion that res judicata prevents the 
United States and the tribe from litigating the claim in total against 
79 463 U.S. 110 (1983). 
80 Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club and Friends of The Earth at 27, Nevada v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (81-2245) [hereinafter Sierra Club Brief]. 
81 463 U.S. at 113. 
82 [d. at 116. 
83 [d. at 118. 
84 [d. 
85 [d. at 113. 
86 [d. at 118. 
m [d. 
88 [d. at 119. 
89 [d. 
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all defendants including those who had not been parties to the orig-
inallitigation. 90 Amici argued that Indian law and trust law as well 
as the principles of res judicata, due process, and judicial review, 
required a finding that the tribe's water rights and Pyramid Lake 
should be preserved. 91 The Court agreed with the environmentalists' 
assertion, noting that, because the 1944 decree finally determined 
those rights asserted in the 1973 suit only against additional defen-
dants, res judicata prevents the U.S. and the [intervenor] - Pyr-
amid Lake Paiute Tribe - from litigating the instant claim in total 
against all defendants including those who had not been parties or 
successors to parties of the original, [1913] litigation. 92 
In the Nevada case, three features of the amicus brief filed by 
the FOE and the SC are noteworthy. In fact, they may provide an 
insight into the environmentalists' success in this case. First, the 
brief is written in literary, almost poetic language: 
For almost a century and a half visitors from John Charles 
Fremont to modern travellers in automobiles have come over 
ridges and caught their breath as they gazed down on an aqua-
marine sheet stretching out across the high pastel desert for 
nearly twenty-five miles. It is not the duty of this Court in the 
first instance to protect Pyramid Lake or its Indian people, 
future visitors, vistas, fish, or birds. That is for Congress. 93 
Secondly, the standings in Nevada reinforces observations that lib-
eral law firms are either headquartered in a law school or closely 
affiliated with one. 94 The amicus brief required no less than six 
authors from six different law schools and the counsel of record 
included four law professors from four different law schools. The 
quality of the brief as well as its tone reflects their contribution. 
Finally, amici in Nevada had been involved with the litigation since 
its inception. The Sierra Club, for instance, had established its Pyr-
amid Lake Task Force in 1971 in order to promote the preservation 
of Pyramid Lake.95 Both the SC and the FOE had been active in the 
effort to maintain desirable spawning conditions in the Truckee 
River, to reestablish the spawning runs of the Lahontan Cut-Throat 
Trout and cui-ui, and to protect Pyramid Lake's cormorants and 
90 [d. at 113-22. 
91 [d. at 6-11. 
92 463 U. S. at 139-44. 
93 Sierra Club Brief, supra note 80, at 27-28. 
94 O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 6, at 504. 
95 Sierra Club Brief, supra note 80, at 2. 
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white pelicans. 96 Thus the combination of strong written advocacy 
with academic expertise and historical involvement with the litiga-
tion's issues may have played a significant role in the outcome of the 
case. 
The decision in Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, 
San Pasqual, Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians97 rep-
resents the successful culmination of environmental cooperation. All 
four environmental groups discussed in this article participated as 
amicus curiae in support of the respondent Native American tribes. 
In addition to these four groups, sixteen other environmental inter-
est groups joined as amici. 98 
Escondido concerned whether the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission may reject the Department of Interior's license condi-
tions that were deemed necessary to mitigate damage to federal 
reservations from private hydroelectric power projects. 99 Escondido 
sought to relicense one of its irrigation projects, and the Department 
of the Interior attached conditions to the license in order to protect 
the Indians' interest. 1OO The Commission then rejected most of the 
conditions. The Court agreed with the amici and affirmed the lower 
court's decision that the Commission must include in hydroelectric 
licenses those conditions deemed necessary by land management 
agencies. 101 
Thus, as Table I below confirms, environmentalists have fared 
well before the present Supreme Court. Another pattern emerges 
from the analysis in Table 1: the United States government not only 
participated in all seven cases, but was, in fact, victorious in every 
case except Escondido. 
II. THE "CONSERVATIVE" INTEREST GROUPS 
Just as there are myriad "liberal" environmental interest groups, 
so too there are "conservative" public interest law firms. Unlike 
their liberal counterparts, most are regional, and thus are neither 
96 Id. 
97 466 u.s. 765 (1984). 
98 Other amici included American Rivers Conservation Council, California Trout, Colorado 
Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Policy Institute, Friends 
of the River, Idaho Environmental Council, Idaho Wildlife Federation, Izaak Walton League 
of America, Montana Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society, Oregon Wildlife Fed-
eration, Trout Unlimited, Wilderness Society. 
99 N.W.F. Brief, supra note 39, at i. 
100 Id. at 4. 
101 466 U.S. at 772-79; N.W.F. Brief, supra note 39, at 4-21. 
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TABLE 1. 
Cases With Environmental Group Participation 
Case Environmental U.S. SU Environmental 
Group(s) gov't (W/L) Groups Success 
(W/L) 
North Dakota v. U.S. NWF X W W 
Sec. of the Int. NRDC X W L 
v. Cal. 
Ruckelshaus v. FOE, NRDC, SC X W W 
Monsanto 
Chemical Manu- NRDC X W L 
facturer's v. 
NRDC 
California v. SC NWF, SC X W L 
Nevada v. U.S. FOE,SC X W W 
Escondido Mutual FOE, NRDC, X L W 
v. LaJolla NWF, SC 
Total U.S. success rate: 86% 
Total Environmentalists success rate: 57% 
local nor national in scope. Four groups in particular have been 
involved in environmental litigation: the Mid-America Legal Foun-
dation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the New England 
Legal Foundation, and the Pacific Legal Foundation. 102 
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) was founded in Sacramento, 
California in 1973 by members of Governor Reagan's administration 
who were concerned about perceived gains being made by environ-
mentalists in the COurtS.103 According to Attorney General Edwin 
Meese, one of the founding members of the PLF, Governor Reagan's 
staff decided that the courts must be presented with a different 
perspective on the public interest. 104 
Public support for PLF and its goals soon led other conservatives 
to explore the possibility of creating a nationwide system of such 
firmS.105 Thus, assisted by a grant from the Scaife Foundation, the 
National Legal Center for the Public Interest (NLCPI) was created 
in 1975 to facilitate the establishment of regional law firms modeled 
102 For a more detailed discussion, see O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 6, at 493-501; 
Houck, supra note 2, at 1454-1514. 
108 See Houck, supra note 2, at 1458-68. 
104 Interview with Edwin Meese, United States Attorney General, in Washington, D.C. 
(Aug. 1983). 
105 For a detailed discussion of the creation of N.L.C.P.I., see Houck, supra note 2, at 1474-
78. 
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on PLF.106 By 1978, six firms, including the Mid-America and Moun-
tain States Legal Foundations, had been created. 107 The Mountain 
States Legal Foundation has been involved in environmental issues 
since its creation. The philosophy of its first president, James Watt, 
made a clear imprint on the direction of the firm as it moved to 
litigate a variety of environmental cases including those involving 
issues of public access to federal lands and state water rights. 108 
The next section of this article examines more carefully the in-
volvement of these groups as either amicus curiae or as parties in 
environmental litigation in the United States Supreme Court from 
1979 to 1984. The Mid-America Legal Foundation (MALF), the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), the New England Legal 
Foundation (NELF), and PLF have participated either as amici or 
as parties in thirteen environmental cases before the Court,l09 and 
they were successful in thirty percent of the cases. This section of 
the article examines closely six of these cases. Environmental inter-
est groups did not participate in any of them. 
NELF possesses the most successful litigation record of the foun-
dations. NELF was an amicus curiae in New England Power Co. 
v. New Hampshire Public Utilities CommissionYo New England 
Power involved an order by the New Hampshire Public Utilities 
Commission that required utilities operating hydroelectric facilities 
in the state to obtain permission to transmit electricity out-of-
state.ll1 In essence, the order would have forced New England 
Power Company to halt all interstate transmission of hydroelectric 
100 [d. 
107 O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 6, at 496-97. 
lOS Interview with James Watt in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1983). 
109 Cases determined to be "non" environmental ones include: Town of Hallie v. City of Eau 
Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); Motor 
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 
U.S. 388 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); White v. Massachusetts Council of 
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 
(1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Merrion 
v. Jicarilla-Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 
72 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Metromedia, Inc. 
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981); 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); City of Rome v. United States, 
446 U.S. 156 (1980); Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Babbit v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Cleland 
v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 (1978). 
no 455 U.S. 331 (1982). 
111 [d. 
1986] WOODSY WITCHDOCTORS 503 
energy.112 The power company argued that the Commission's order 
was preempted by sections of the Federal Power Act11a and imposed 
impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. 114 The Commission, 
on the other hand, maintained that the Act "granted New Hampshire 
authority to restrict the interstate transportation of hydroelectric 
power generated within the State. "115 The Commission argued, fur-
thermore, that the Act's delegation of authority to the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission "shall not . . . deprive a . . . State 
commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exporta-
tion of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State 
line. "116 The Court disagreed with the Commission and agreed with 
NELF holding that its order violated the commerce clause. 
NELF and MALF both filed amicus curiae briefs in City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois.l17 NELF and MALF, curiously, sought different 
results. The procedural postures of City of Milwaukee defy simplistic 
delineation. In previous litigation, the state of Illinois filed a com-
plaint alleging that untreated sewage overflows and inadequately 
treated sewage discharges from Milwaukee entered Lake Michigan 
that constituted a threat to the health of Illinois citizens. 118 Illinois 
filed its complaint under the original jurisdiction of the United States 
Supreme Court. 119 Though the Court recognized the existence of a 
federal common law that could give rise to a claim for abatement of 
a nuisance caused by interstate water pollution, it declined jurisdic-
tion. 120 
Illinois then sought relief in both the Illinois state court and the 
federal district court. Illinois filed in the federal district court, seek-
ing abatement under federal common law, of the alleged public nuis-
ance created by the sewage discharges. 121 In 1972, however, during 
the pendency of the case, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Actl22 that established a new system of pollution 
112 [d. 
113 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-824k (1982). 
114 455 U.S. at 337. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. at 341. 
117 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
118 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1971). 
119 [d. 
120 [d. at 107-08. 
121 People of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
122 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(1972). 
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regulation which prohibited the discharge of pollutants into the na-
tion's waters without a permit. l23 When Milwaukee continued to 
discharge sewage in violation of the permit requirements, the Illinois 
state court ordered the city to comply with effluent limitations set 
forth in the permit.l24 The federal district court determined that 
Illinois had proved the existence of a nuisance under federal common 
law. 125 On appeal the Seventh Circuit held that the Act did not 
preempt the federal common law of nuisance,126 but that the state 
effluent limitations set by the state court were more stringent than 
those in the federal permits. 127 The court ordered the city to elimi-
nate overflows and to comply with the federal permit effluent limi-
tations. 128 On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Cir-
cuit's judgment and held that the remedy under federal common law 
of nuisance was not available to Illinois. 129 
In Milwaukee, the court was confronted with the issue of whether 
a federal common law of nuisance was available to Illinois in its 
efforts to abate Milwaukee's sewer discharges. Milwaukee argued 
forcefully that "federal legislation on the subject of interstate waters 
establishes the federal law in place of previously applicable federal 
common law principles. "130 The State of Illinois also sought to apply 
its state law of tortious nuisance. Moreover, Illinois argued that its 
long-arm statute reached non-resident defendants who commit acts 
in other states which result in injury in Illinois. 131 
The NELF brief supporting Illinois focused primarily upon the 
contention that federal common law provided the correct remedy: 
The exercise . . . of control over air and water emissions impli-
cates a host of values -land use and planning, municipal finance, 
industrial development, protection of the public health, and the 
preservation of ecological rights - traditionally within the ambit 
of state and local government. When the determination of those 
values by one state may conflict with that of another, the main-
tenance of the federal relationship requires that the federal ju-
diciary fashion an equitable resolution from the federal common 
123 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1976 and Supp. 1979). 
124 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 311. 
125 [d. 
126 People of Illinois, 599 F.2d at 162. 
127 [d. at 177. 
128 [d. 
129 City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 332. 
130 Brief of Petitioners, City of Milwaukee at 25, City of Milwaukee v. States of Illinois and 
Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (79-408). 
131 Brief of Respondent, State of Illinois at 24-26, City of Milwaukee v. States of Illinois 
and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (79-408). 
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law .... The Federal Water Pollution Control Act represents 
a plainly and purposely limited expression of federal policy in-
tended to supplement, rather than to subvert, both the state 
and federal interests which here justify the application of the 
federal common law. 132 
505 
In contrast, MALF asserted in its brief that the Court of Appeals 
improperly applied the federal common law of nuisance in the context 
of a comprehensive federal statutory and regulatory program for 
water pollution control. 133 Pointing out the potential risks in enlarg-
ing the scope of common law remedies, MALF maintained somewhat 
nebulously that 
where a statutory framework of regulation tolerates certain risks 
of harm, the expansion of common-law remedies to protect 
against the same risks interferes with the efficient operation of 
the regulatory scheme, upsets reasonable expectations, and re-
quires vast expenditures without any clear hope of significant 
improvements in public health or safety. 134 
Of the four conservative public interest groups examined in this 
article MALF appears the most amorphous. While MSLF, NELF, 
and PLF articulate a precise vision of their role within the judicial 
process, MALF states that it seeks "to engage in non-partisan legal 
research, study and analysis for the benefit of the general public as 
to the effect of evolving concepts of law on our democratic institu-
tions .... "135 The fact that MALF has been successful only twice in 
its participation in environmental cases before the Court may well 
be a reflection of its lack of a precise focus. 
Another example of a conservative group's attempt to influence 
environmental litigation as amicus is seen in MSLF's involvement 
in United States v. Ward136 which involved an oil leak from an oil 
and gas well. When the well owner reported the spill to the EPA, 
the Coast Guard imposed civil penalties on the basis of the report. 
In its brief, the MSLF asserted that a person cannot be required, 
under penalty of fine or imprisonment, to report the violation of a 
132 Brief of Amicus Curiae, New England Legal Foundation, in Support of Respondents at 
29, City of Milwaukee v. States of Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (79--408). 
133 Brief of Mid-America Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae at 4-14, City of Milwaukee 
v. States of Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (79-408). 
134 [d. at 9. 
135 Motion of Mid-America Legal Foundation for Leave to File as Amicus Curiae at 2, City 
of Milwaukee v. States of Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (79-408). 
136 In its March 15, 1985 "package" sent to one of the authors, MSLF enclosed sixty pages 
of "briefs" of their current court participation. These notations, consequently, refer to the 
page numbers MSLF designated for these cases. 
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statute or regulation, and then be fined for such violation on the 
basis of his own report. 137 The Tenth Circuit agreed with this rea-
soning and ruled in favor of the well owner.l38 Upon review of the 
Tenth Circuit's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and up-
held self-reporting requirements. 139 Here again, MSLF was arguing 
for the interests of the individual over the interest of the government 
in regulating the environment. While issues of self-incrimination 
clearly existed in the EPA reporting requirement, the Supreme 
Court adopted the government's position on the issue of clean 
waters. 
MSLF experienced another adverse decision in its efforts to per-
suade the Court to find the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act un-
constitutional in United States v. Ptasynski.140 MSLF participated 
in Ptasynski as co-council for the state of Louisiana. 141 The State 
argued that the tax was an irrational and discriminatory tax that 
impedes U. S. energy independence and seizes the private property 
of a politically unpopular minority.142 As enacted, the tax act of 1980 
grants an exemption from the tax to domestic crude oil produced in 
wells north of the Alaskan pipeline. Believing that this kind of an 
exemption unfairly discriminated against other oil producers and 
violated the Uniformity Clause's provision that all taxes must be 
uniform throughout the United States, the MSLF argued stren-
uously against the tax, but to no avail. The Court instead found that 
Congress had deliberately considered the issue and concluded that 
Alaskan oil was more difficult to produce. Again, the Court deferred 
to the findings of another branch of government. 
Further evidence of the conservative public interest group's un-
successful advocacy before the Court is illustrated by Costle v. Pa-
cific Legal Foundation. l43 The Pacific Legal Foundation filed peti-
tions with the Court of Appeals seeking a review of the EPA's denial 
of PLF's request for an adjudicatory hearing concerning the exten-
sion of Los Angeles's permit to discharge sewage into the Pacific 
137 Brief of the Amici Curiae: Mountain States Legal Foundation, et al. at 2, United States 
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (79-394). 
138 Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, rev'd sub. nom. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 
(1980). 
139 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
140 462 U.S. 74 (1983). 
141 Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 75. 
142 Brief of State of Louisiana, Appellee at 7-50, United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 
(1983) (82-1066). 
143 445 U.S. 198 (1980). Tony Quinn mentions in his article PLF's involvement against EPA 
when EPA "tried to force Los Angeles to build a new ... sewage treatment plant .... " 
Research continues as to whether this refers to Costle. See Quinn, supra note 2. 
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Ocean. Los Angeles's current permit was to expire and the EPA 
advised the city (pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972 § 402 (33 U.S.C.S. § 1342» that it proposed 
to extend the expiration date. l44 When neither the City of Los 
Angeles nor any other party (e.g., PLF) requested a hearing con-
cerning the proposal, the EPA determined that a public hearing was 
not warranted. 
The EPA presented two arguments. First of all, the EPA main-
tained that even when [the Clean Water Act] calls with seeming 
unequivocation for a full hearing before the denial of a license, the 
agency may condition such a hearing on filing an application that 
would warrant hearing. 145 Secondly, the EPA argued that PLF failed 
to to present any material issues of fact in its application for a 
hearing. 146 
PLF centered upon the EPA's inadequate notice of the license 
hearing. PLF argued that the EPA did not provide due notice of its 
decision to terminate consideration of revised discharge require-
ments. PLF contended that a fundamental requirement of due notice 
is that it be communicated in a manner reasonably calculated, in all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. 147 In short, according to PLF, the EPA's Los Angeles Times 
notice was statutorily inadequate. 
In Costle the PLF argued that it sought to present to EPA, on a 
public record, at a hearing, information and arguments relating to 
the adverse impacts on people, fish, and wildlife that would result if 
the EPA modified the wastewater processing requirements for the 
Los Angeles Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant. l48 The EPA 
had decided to order an alternative sludge disposal method to the 
Hyperion Plant and to terminate the development of revised permit 
requirements. 149 PLF argued in its amicus brief that the current 
wastewater treatment program discharged sludge containing large 
amounts of nutrients into the marine waters which supports much 
of the marine life. 150 Moreover, PLF contended that the EPA was 
obligated by the National Environmental Policy Act to hold a hearing 
144 Costle, 445 u.s. at 207. 
145 See id. at 21l. 
146 See id. at 213. 
147 Brief for Respondents at 26, Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980) (78-
1472) (citations omitted). 
148 [d. at 5-6. 
149 [d. at 6-7. 
150 [d. at 7. 
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prior to issuing any new permits. 151 The Court disagreed: EPA reg-
ulations only required that there be "opportunity for public hearing" 
with respect to action on National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System permit. 152 The Court determined that the requirement was 
valid and properly applied in extending the permit expiration date. 153 
Similarly, the Court's decision in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Commission154 represents another significant loss for conservatives, 
although Pacific Gas included efforts to support the construction of 
nuclear power plants. This case involved a challenge of a California 
statute by two California electric utility companies. The controversy 
arose when the California Legislature enacted the statute that pro-
hibited the construction of new nuclear plants until the State Energy 
Resources Conservation and Development Commission certified that 
the Federal government had approved a disposal method for high 
level nuclear wastes. 155 
The plaintiffs argued for federal preemption. According to the 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the Atomic Energy Act 
preempted state prohibition or regulation of construction and oper-
ation of nuclear power plants.156 The Act's amendments manifest a 
continuing congressional purpose to encourage and foster the private 
development of nuclear power plants as electric power resources in 
the United States157 The state statute, in the utility's view, was 
invalid because it was in conflict with, and preempted by, the federal 
law. 158 
The State's position, argued by Lawrence Tribe, contended that 
the Atomic Energy Act leaves each state free to decide for itself 
how best to meet its citizens' electrical energy needs and thus to 
make precisely the kinds of choices which the State made. "159 Ac-
cording to the commission, the fact that the state's laws expressly 
take into account problems of nuclear waste and disposal, created 
no conflict with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's role in the 
licensing nuclear facilities and the regulation of radiation hazards. 160 
151 [d. at 9. 
152 445 U.S. at 214. 
153 [d. at 216. 
154 461 U.S. at 190 (1983). 
155 [d. at 193-200. 
156 See Petitioners' Brief at 20-32, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (81-1945). 
157 See id. at 33-37. 
158 [d. at 1044. 
159 [d. 
160 [d. 
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In Pacific Gas, MALF, NELF, and PLF all filed amicus curiae 
briefs. Though submitted separately, the fact that each brief argues 
the issue from a somewhat different perspective suggests a certain 
degree of cooperation and coordination among them. MALF asserted 
that the state statute was preempted by federal regulations because 
it obstructed Congress' express policy to encourage the development 
of nuclear power for the public goOd. 161 Sounding much like MSLF, 
MALF argued that if the statute was upheld it would open the 
floodgates for similar measures in other states and, in general, un-
dermine federal preemption standards. 162 In contrast, PLF relied on 
economic arguments to convince the Court of the statute's invalidity. 
PLF raised the issue of the statute's impact on energy supplies and 
jobs both in California and in the United States. l63 PLF maintained 
that the nuclear moratorium was an invasion of an area reserved for 
federal regulation as well as an obstruction of the federal policy to 
encourage nuclear energy.l64 NELF harmonized a constitutional ar-
gument with a pragmatic one, arguing that the California statute 
violated the Supremacy Clause and threatened development of safe 
nuclear waste disposal facilities. 165 
The Court rejected the arguments forwarded by the amici and 
held that the federal legislative goals expressed in the Atomic En-
ergy Act did not preempt the California statute. 166 In concluding his 
opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that "the promotion of nuclear 
power is not to be accomplished 'at all costs' . . . . Congress has left 
sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear 
power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons. "167 Thus, 
in the past, the conservative legal foundations have not fared well 
in litigation before the Supreme Court. Additionally, as illustrated 
in Table 2, the conservative legal foundations, unlike their liberal 
counterparts, appear more frequently before the Court to oppose 
the position advanced by the United States government. 
161 Brief of Hans A. Bethe, et al., Members of Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, 
Inc. and Mid-America Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4-5, 
Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (81-1945). 
162 Id. at 5-9. 
163 Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners at 2--3, Pacific 
Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983) (81-1945). 
164 Id. at 3-4. 
166 Brief of Amicus Curiae, New England Legal Foundation, in Support of Petitioners at 
11-12, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190 (1983) (81-1945). 
166 461 U.S. at 205-16. 
167Id. at 222-23. 
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TABLE 2. 
Cases with Conservative Firm Participation 
Case 
New England Power Co. 
v. N.H. Public 
Utilities Comm'n 
City of Milwaukee v. 
Del. 
Ward v. Coleman 
U.S. v. Ptasynski 
Costle v. PLF 
Pacific Gas & Electric 
v. State Energy 
Resources Conserva-
tion and Development 
Comm'n 
Total U.S. success rate: 100% 
Conservative Firm 
NELF 
NELF, MALF 
MSLF 
MSLF 
PLF 
MALF, NELF, PLF 
Total conservative firm success rate: 33% 
U.S. 
gov'tlsuccess 
(W/L) 
x 
X 
X 
W 
W 
W 
[Vol. 13:487 
Conservative 
Firm Success 
(WIL) 
W 
L 
L 
L 
L 
III. FROM RHETORIC TO CLEAR CONFRONTATIONI68 
Environmental "woodsy witchdoctors" confronted conservative 
"judicial guerrillas" in seven environmental cases before the Court 
from 1979 to 1984.169 The environmentalists prevailed in five of those 
battles; the conservatives were successful in two. The first confron-
tation between the foundations selected for examination in this ar-
ticle was between the NELF and the NRDC in Environmental 
Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Association in 1980.170 
The NRDC asserted that the issues presented by the case revolved 
around one of the Clean Water Act's most important principles.l71 
In Crushed Stone, the EPA sought to enforce its limitation on in-
168 Hill, The Politics of Environmental Law, 64 MICH. B.J. 164, 164-65 (1985). 
169 The following represents "non"-environmental cases in which both environmental and 
conservative public interest law firms participated: Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (provisions of Utility Act constitutional); San Diego Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (denial of monetary remedies for taking 
dismissed); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinances not on their face 
a taking) Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (commission's 
order barring enclosures by utilities discussing nuclear power violates Constitution). 
170 449 U.S. 64 (1980). 
171 National Resources Defense Council as Amicus Curiae Brief at 1-6, Environmental 
Protection Agency V. National Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (79-770) [hereinafter 
N.R.D.C. Amicus Brief]. 
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dustrial pollutant discharges pursuant to the Clean Water Act.172 
The regulations pennit polluting industries to seek a variance from 
these nationally applicable limitations if they are able to show that 
the factors relating to equipment or facilities involved, the process 
applied, or other such factors related to the discharge are funda-
mentally different from the factors considered in the establishment 
of the guidelines. 173 The Court thus addressed the issue of whether 
costs of compliance or extraordinary economic hardship that arise 
from the enforcement of uniform effluent standards constitute special 
circumstances worthy of consideration in a variance application. 174 
The Court agreed that pollutors' economic capability for meeting 
1977 best practicable technology under the Act was not a factor in 
considering an application for a variance. 175 
Arguments set forth by competing amici reflect the competing 
interests involved in Crushed Stone. The NELF introduced itself to 
the Court as helpful to the case "due to its unique public interest 
perspective and extensive work on environmental and economic is-
sues."176 The NELF maintained that "substantially divergent costs 
of compliance and extraordinary economic hardship arising from 
enforcement of uniform effluent standards are both special circum-
stances worthy of consideration in a variance application."I77 Present 
also in the NELF's argument is a common conservative theme: the 
implications of a particular decision upon the nation's welfare. "The 
Foundation is concerned," the NELF's brief notes, "that the enforce-
ment of the [EPA]'s inflexible variance provision will unnecessarily 
jeopardize the economic health of the New England community."178 
The decision in Crushed Stone179 represented the culmination of 
NRDC's efforts to force the EPA to enforce environmental statutes. 
NRDC maintained in its brief that the Court's decision in Crushed 
Stone potentially affected the integrity and validity of the EPA 
regulations. 180 The NRDC's argument was primarily one of statutory 
172 See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 66-68. 
173 Brief of Amicus Curiae New England Legal Foundation in Support of Appelless at 6, 
Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (79-
770) [hereinafter N.E.L.F. Amicus Brief]. 
174 Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 68-69. 
175 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1977), amended by § 1311(b) 
(1982). 
176 See N.E.L.F. Amicus brief, supra note 173, at 2. 
177 [d. at 8. 
178 [d. at 2. 
179 449 U.S. at 64 (1980). 
ISO See N.R.D.C. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 6. 
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interpretation; it argued that the act neither requires nor authorizes 
consideration of economic affects. The Court agreed with the NRDC 
arguments, which strengthened environmentalists' confidence that 
the Court would protect the integrity of environmental statutes. 
Two months after the Court decided Crushed Stone, the Sierra 
Club and MALF participated in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co. as amici. 181 The Clover Leaf litigation began when suit was filed 
in the Minnesota district court by manufacturers of plastic milk 
cartons, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Minnesota statute 
banning retail sale of milk in plastic containers.182 The state district 
court agreed with the manufacturers and enjoined enforcement of 
the statute, finding that it violated the fourteenth amendment, the 
commerce clause of the United States Constitution, as well as the 
due process provisions of the state constitution. 183 The state supreme 
court, without reaching the commerce clause or state law issues, 
agreed that the statute violated the federal equal protection and due 
process guarantees. 184 
Once again, the case embodied the culmination of the participation 
by environmentalists throughout the entire process. The Sierra Club 
for instance, "participated in the legislative processes leading to the 
enactment" of the statute itself.l85 One senses, however, that the 
statute did not go quite far enough for their environmental interests. 
The Sierra Club admits in its brief that while it "strongly supports 
the use of returnable containers for food, beverages, and other items 
wherever feasible . . . [it] does not support the use of either non-
returnable paper milk containers or non-returnable plastic milk con-
tainers. "186 
In its amici brief to the court in Clover Leaf, MALF argued that 
the statute does not advance environmental goals, and that a ban on 
plastic containers, without a similar ban on paperboard containers, 
is a step backward from the environmental goals of the Act. 187 The 
arguments forwarded by MALF were primarily economic ones: "The 
statute reflects the very type of economic protectionism which the 
commerce clause was designed to prevent."l88 The Court's rejection 
181 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
182 Id. at 459-60. 
183 Id. at 460. 
184 Id. 
185 Sierra Club Brief, supra note 35, at 1-2. 
186 Id. 
187 Brief of Mid-America Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
3-4, Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (79-1171). 
188 I d. at 15. 
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of MALF's economic argument and its favorable stance toward the 
enforcement of local environmental statutes were greeted with en-
thusiasm by environmentalists who were wary that the Justices 
might be persuaded by MALF's economic arguments. 
Hodel v. Indiana (Hodel 1)189, and Hodel v. Virginia Mining and 
Reclamation Association (Hodel II)190 were decided by the Court 
during the same term as Clover Leaf, and added to the number of 
environmental successes before the Court. The litigation defeat for 
the conservative public interest firms is greater in Hodel I because 
not one, but three conservative groups submitted amicus briefs. 
Although these are two independent cases, they involve similar 
environmental issues. In fact, the environmentalists who submitted 
amici briefs, treated both cases in the same brief. 
Both cases involved the regulatory parameters of the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (The Act). 191 Essentially Con-
gress intended the Act to preserve "the productive capacity of mined 
land and [to protect] the public from health and safety hazards that 
may result from surface coal mining."192 In Hodel I, the state of 
Indiana and coal mine operators sought to overturn the Act on the 
grounds that it was violative of the equal protection, due process, 
and just compensation clauses, as well as the tenth amendment. 193 
Of major concern in Hodel I was the effect of the Act upon surface 
mining on prime farmland. In Hodel II [a]n association of coal pro-
ducers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, mem-
ber coal companies, and individual landowners sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act. l94 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged 
that provisions of the Act establishing an interim regulatory program 
violated the commerce clause as well as the equal protection and due 
process guarantees of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 195 The challenged provisions included performance standards 
for steep slopes, regulations governing the conditions under which 
surface coal mining operations may be conducted, and the Secre-
tary's authority to issue orders for the immediate cessation of surface 
mining operations determined to be in violation of the Act. 196 Of 
189 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
190 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
191 Surface Mi~ing Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202 (1977). 
192 452 U.S. at 327. 
193 Id. at 320. 
194 452 U.S. 264, 273 (1981). 
195Id. 
196 See id. at 269-70. 
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concern here was the argument that "the Act operated to displace 
the state's freedom to structure operations in numerous areas of 
traditional functions. 197 The constitutional challenges were identical 
to those at issue in Hodel I. 
The NWF and FOE joined the litigation as amici curiae, in ad-
dition to the Appalachian Coalition, Council of the Southern Moun-
tains, Illinois South, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, and Tug 
Valley Recovery Center.l98 These amici urged the reversal of the 
lower courts' decisions on the grounds that provisions of the Surface 
Mining Act are fully consistent with the requirements of the Con-
stitution. 199 The environmentalists maintained that "[t]hose provi-
sions . . . are vital to the preservation of significant social and en-
vironmental values. "200 These groups argued that neither "summary 
cessation" nor "payment into escrow of proposed civil penalty as-
sessment" nor the "return of mined land to approximate original 
contour" violated any constitutional provisions. 201 
Both Hodel 1 and Hodel II attracted the brief-writing attention of 
three conservative public interest groups. MALF submitted an ami-
cus brief in Hodel 1;202 PLF participated in Hodel II as an amicus;203 
and the MSLF participated as an amicus in both cases. 204 
MALF's argument in Hodel 1 asserted that individual states 
should regulate surface mining reclamation since it is an inherently 
local activity.205 Furthermore, MALF argued, sections of the Recla-
mation Act exceed congressional authority.206 PLF used an argument 
197 Id. at 274. 
198 Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants by The National Wildlife Federation, 
Appalation Coalition, Council of Southern Mountains, Inc., Illinois South, Save Our Cumber-
land Mountains and The Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc., Hodel v. Virginia Mining Co. 452 
U.S. 264 (1981) (79-1538). 
199 Id. at 24-25. 
200 Id. at 30. 
201Id. at 3-5. 
202 Brief of Mid-America Legal Foundation Supporting the Position of Appellees, Hodel v. 
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (80-231) [hereinafter M.A.L.F. Brief]. 
203 Brief of Amici Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellees, Hodel v. Virginia 
Mining Co., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (79-1538) [hereinafter P.L.F. Brief]. 
204 Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclaimation Asso-
ciation and the State of Indiana, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (80-231); Hodel v. 
Virginia Mining Co., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
206 M.A.L.F. Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 3. 
006 The suits included challenges to the "prime farmland" provisions of the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act, §§ 507(b)(16), 508(a)(2)(c), 51O(d)(1), 515(b)(7), (20) and 519(c)(2), 
91 Stat. 475-502 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(b)(16), 1258(a)(2)(c), 1260(d)(1), 1265(b)(7), 
(20), and 1269(c)(2) (1982». As Justice Marshall indicates in his opinion for the Court, the 
"prime farmland" provisions "establish special requirements for surface mining operations 
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that in many of its publications it had criticized the environmentalists 
for using: the threat of energy dependency. PLF argued that surface 
mining of domestic coal reserves is one of the best solutions for the 
problems posed by American dependence on foreign energy 
sources. 207 
United States v. Locke represents the most recent confrontation 
between environmentalists and conservative legal foundations in 
which the environmentalists prevailed.208 In Locke, the United 
States Bureau of Land Management informed mining claims owners 
that their claims were void because they failed to file a timely notice 
pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. One 
section of that Act provided that holders of unpatented mining claims 
must file to protect their claims prior to December 31 and the re-
spondents filed on December 31. As a result, their claims were 
forfeited. 209 The Court held there was not a taking and that the 
owners failure to file voided their mining claims. 
The Sierra Club filed an amicus curiae brief in Locke to further 
its members' interests in protecting recreational areas - an idea 
not addressed by the U.S. in its brief. According to the Sierra Club, 
"protection of recreational areas is dependent in large measure on 
the effective performance" of the Secretary, and thus a judicial 
finding of the constitutionality of the filing provision would enable 
the Secretary "to manage the public lands, to enhance and encourage 
outdoor recreational uses. "210 The Sierra Club asserted that the 
applicable section of the Act furthered a legitimate state goal and 
that the Court should defer to Congress' choice of means to effec-
tuate that purpose. 211 The Sierra Club thus endorsed the statute and 
its filing provisions, even though the result in this particular case 
was severe.212 In contrast to the lengthy Sierra Club brief, the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation catalogued "more than 800"213 
conducted on land that both qualifies as prime farmland . . . and has historically been used as 
cropland .... " Hodel v. State of Indiana, 452 U.S. at 318. As the Act states, such factors 
as "moisture, availability, temperature regime, chemical balance . . . and erosion character-
istics," among others are used in determining "prime farmland" status. § 701(20), 91 Stat. 517 
(1977), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(20) (1982). 
2IJ7 P.L.F. Amicus Brief, supra note 203, at 15. 
208 U.S. v. Locke, 105 S.Ct. 1785 (1985). 
209 Id. at 1790. 
210 Amicus Curiae Brief of Sierra Club in Support of Appellants at 2, U.S. v. Locke, 105 
S. Ct. 1785 (1985) (83-1394). 
211 See id. at 9-27, 54--57. 
212Id. at 57. 
213 Brief Amicus Curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation at 3-7, U.S. v. Locke, 105 S. 
Ct. 1785 (1985) (83-1394). 
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other instances in which unpatented mining claims resulted in the 
loss of 20,000 active sites due to strict interpretation of the regula-
tions. The MSLF describes the Act and its filing regulations as a 
"Byzantine regulatory labyrinth" which deprives individuals of pri-
vate property rights without due process of law. "214 MSLF main-
tained that even competent attorneys cannot comprehend relevant 
provisions of the Act. 215 
The MSLF brief caught the attention of Justice Brennan. In his 
dissent, Justice Brennan noted that amici attempted to employ 
"every technical construction of the statute to suck up active mining 
claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not watched closely, will suck 
up jewelry or loose money. "216 
The conservative public interest law firms were successful as ami-
cus curiae in only two environmental cases where they were opposed 
by an environmental group: Baltimore Gas v. Natural Resource 
Defense Council,217 and Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council. 218 At issue in Baltimore Gas was a Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (NRC) rule that assumed the permanent storage 
of nuclear wastes had no environmental impact and therefore that 
storage should not be an issue in licensing decisions. 219 In challenging 
the validity of the NRC's rule, the NRDC posited two main argu-
ments. First, that agencies may not exclude significant potential 
environmental impacts from their decisions merely because such 
effects are not considered likely to occur.220 Second, should the NRC 
conclude that there is no significant environmental risk from high-
level nuclear waste, it would be arbitrary and capricious in light of 
the facts of the record. 221 
In opposing these arguments, the Pacific Legal Foundation as 
amici asserted that "scientific uncertainty"222 concerning the poten-
tial hazards of nuclear waste storage should be subordinate to judicial 
deference to administrative findings. This argument was persuasive 
and the Court unanimously upheld the NRC rule. 
214Id. at 2. 
215Id. at 1-2. 
216 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1808 n.12 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
217 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
218 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
219 462 U.S. at 89-90. 
220 Brief for Respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. at 28--il7, Baltimore Gas 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (82--524). 
221Id. 
222 Pacific Legal Foundation Response for Petitioners at 2-8, Baltimore Gas v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (82--524). 
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Rules also were involved in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.National 
Resources Defense Council. 223 In Chevron, the Court's decision was 
a decided victory for the conservative legal foundations. Newspapers 
proclaimed that the Court's 6-0 decision represented support for 
President Reagan's effort to relax certain national air pollution reg-
ulations and was a defeat for environmentalists. 224 The issue in Chev-
ron was whether the Clean Air Act225 permits the EPA to define the 
term "stationary source" to mean the industrial plant, but not major 
new units built within plants, for purposes of pollution control re-
quirements. 226 
The NRDC, as the respondent in Chevron, noted that implemen-
tation of the rules may be costly, but that environmental concerns 
required the Court to find that administrative determinations which 
in effect excepted some polluters from coverage under the Act should 
be found invalid. NRDC argued that the term "stationary source" 
includes individual units of production and pollution within a major 
pollution emitting facility.227 Furthermore, according to the NRDC, 
the EPA rules 
discriminate between established firms and newcomers to an 
area. The newcomer must meet all five statutory conditions be-
cause it builds at a new site. The established firm can expand its 
facilities while meeting only one of the five conditions, and only 
partially at that. Nothing in the Act or its legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended to create such a distortion of 
economic competition. 228 
MALF submitted an amicus curiae brief in Chevron that com-
bined two arguments: one had been set forth before; the other was 
relatively new.229 The familiar argument was based on the notion 
that should the Court decide against the EPA, the result would 
detrimentally affect states' ability to protect the environment. 230 
223 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
224 Court Allows EPA to Ease Rules, Atlanta Journal, June 25, 1984, at 3-A. 
225 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 providing for the "stationary source standards" which 
apply to emissions regulations within plants. They include: 42 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(3), 172(b)(6), 
302(j) , 741(a)(3), 7502(b)(3), 7602(j) (1977). 
226 Brief for Respondents, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. at i, Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (82-1005). 
227Id. at 22-26. 
228 Brief of Respondents, supra note 226, at 22-26. 
229 Brief of Mid-America Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Position of 
Petitioners, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(82-1005) [hereinafter M.A.L.F. Amicus Brief]. 
23°Id. at 3. 
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MALF's argument was grounded in technical data provided to the 
Court.231 The data purported to show that use of the bubble concept 
improves air quality and accelerates state compliance with clean air 
standards. 232 
PLF also filed an amicus brief in Chevron.233 Its brief recognized 
the gradual integration by environmentalists of an economic dimen-
sion to its legal efforts to preserve the nation's resources. In fact, 
PLF's brief focused on the economic factors that the Court should 
consider in making its decision by asserting that "that there is great 
public interest in achieving clean air by means which consider the 
economic well-being of this nation.234 The EPA's bubble concept, 
according to PLF, could be invalidated only at the risk of producing 
adverse economic and environmental consequences.235 On the other 
hand, to uphold plant-wide definition of "stationary source" would 
provide industry with the necessary economic incentives to "replace 
older, polluting equipment with newer, less polluting equipment. "236 
By finding in favor of the arguments advanced by the conservative 
legal foundations and the EPA, the Court upheld the EPA's regu-
lations that permit states to treat all pollution emitting devices 
within the same industrial complex similarly.237 This interpretation, 
in effect, exempts pollution-emitting units within plants of major 
emittors, and demonstrates again the Court's deference to admin-
istrative actions. 
Finally, as Table 3 shows, the environmentalists' rate of litigation 
success is closely related to the support of, and cooperation by the 
Justice Department. This fact is important in light of its implication 
that, at least in two terms, it demonstrates a more vocal opposition 
to environmental interests on the part of the Reagan administration. 
231Id. 
232 M.A.L.F. Amicus Brief, supra note 229, at 4. 
The bubble concept is a method of measuring emissions from a factory as if there 
were a plastic bubble over the entire plant with only a single opening at which all 
the emissions from the plant are measured and controlled. This alternative to the 
smokestack by smokestack regulation generally imposed under the [Clean Air] Act 
gives a company the flexibility to achieve the same or better overall emission reduc-
tions at a lower cost. 
Rhinelander, The Proper Place for the Bubble Concept Under the Clean Air Act, 13 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10406, 10406 (1983). 
233 Pacific Legal Foundation Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioners, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defence Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (82-1005). 
234 Id. at 3. 
235 See id. at 19. 
236Id. at 5. 
237 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
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TABLE 3. 
Head-to-Head Confrontation Between 
Environmentalists and Conservative Firms 
Case Environmental (W/L) Conservative (W/L) U.S. (W/L) 
Groups Groups 
E.P.A. v. NRDC W NELF L X W 
N at'l Crushed 
Stone 
Minnesota v. SC W MALF L X W 
Clover Leaf 
Creamery 
Hodel v. Indiana FOE W MALF, MSLF, L X W 
PLF 
Hodel v. Va. FOE, MWF W MSLF,PLF L X W 
Mining & Recla-
mation Assoc. 
U.S. v. Locke SC W MSLF L X W 
Baltimore Gas v. NRDC L PLF W X W 
NRDC 
Chevron v. NRDC NRDC L PLF, MALF W X W 
Total success rate--environmentalists: 71 % 
Total success rate-conservative firms: 29% 
Total success rate-U.S. government: 100% 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article is intended to challenge the prevailing conception that 
liberal, environmental interest groups are losers in the legal battles 
to preserve natural resources. Given the increasing costliness and 
complexity of this kind of litigation, environmentalists were expected 
to falter, and others saw the development of conservative firms and 
the philosophy of the Reagan administration as a potential death 
knell for the cause of environmental protection. 
In quantitative terms, liberal legal foundations were successful in 
five of the seven cases where conservative legal foundations also 
participated. The liberals' legal foundations also won four of seven 
United States Supreme Court in which no conservative legal foun-
dation participated. Conservative legal foundations, on the other 
hand, have prevailed in environmental litigation in only four of thir-
teen cases. 
The reasons underlying such data are several. One explanation is 
that environmental interest groups have included more economic 
analysis and arguments in their response to legal challenges by 
conservative groups. The National Wildlife Federation, for instance, 
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recently established the Corporate Conservation Council designed 
to encourage communication between business leaders and environ-
mentalists. 238 Similarly, Natural Resources Defense Council has pro-
vided detailed policy recommendations as to how energy conserva-
tion replaces energy r~sources at a reduced environmental and 
economic cost. 239 As their amicus briefs in Chevron demonstrate, 
environmental interest groups have become more economically so-
phisticated. 240 
Another explanation for environmentalists' litigation success is 
that many groups, like the NRDC report dramatic increases in 
annual income.241 The Environmental Defense Fund reported an 
increase of 22.6 percent from its 1982 revenues. 242 
23S National Wildlife Federation, Its People, Its Purposes, Its Progress, p.13. 
239 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., 1981-1982 ANNUAL REPORT at 11. The 
Environment Defense Fund also states that its "economists have developed strategies to 
protect the environment in economically sound ways." ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, ANN. REP. 
1982-1983, 1. 
240 See generally M.A. L. F. Amicus Brief, supra note 229; Brief of Respondents, supra note 
226; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 233. 
241 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT at 43 (1984). 
242 ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT at 12 (1984). 
